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Asian countries, like other countries around the world, are in the midst of a 
systematic series of demographic changes known as the demographic tran-
sition, driven by declining fertility and mortality. In addition to declining 
fertility and mortality, the demographic transition involves changes in popu-
lation size, growth rate and age distribution. Populations start and end with 
similar total dependency ratios, but before the transition the dependents are 
primarily children and at the end they are primarily the elderly.
Although children and the elderly are both referred to as dependents, they 
diﬀer in a very important way. Children rely almost exclusively on transfers 
to fi ll the large gap between what they consume and what they earn. The 
elderly, in contrast, rely on a combination of transfers and life- cycle sav-
ing to fi ll the gap between what they consume and what they earn. Thus, 
aging—and the anticipation of aging—can lead to an enormous increase 
in transfers and/ or assets.
For this reason, the shift in the structure of dependency from children to 
the elderly has large potential consequences for the accumulation of physi-
cal capital and human capital, as we shall consider in some detail as our 
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main theme. Closely related to this theme is the important role of institu-
tional arrangements governing intergenerational transfers which interact 
with changing population age distributions and motivation for old- age sup-
port. Depending on these institutions, population aging may either drive 
a vast accumulation of implicit debt in public transfer systems for health 
and retirement, or it may generate a greater accumulation of assets raising 
incomes and perhaps labor productivity depending on whether assets are 
accumulated domestically or abroad.
This is not the place to discuss the causes of changing fertility and mor-
tality, but it will be helpful to begin by considering the general form of 
changes over a classic demographic transition, as done in fi gure 1.1. The 
fi gure shows actual historical and projected data for India from 1890 to 2100, 
along with simulated outcomes based on parameterized curves for fertility 
and mortality. The purpose of the simulated outcomes is to emphasize the 
systematic and regular aspect of the changes shown which result from the 
broad qualitative features of the transition and are not special to the Indian 
context. This stylized transition will then serve as a template for placing the 
transitions in Asia into a broader context.
We see in fi gure 1.1 that the mortality decline in India began early in the 
twentieth century while fertility did not begin to decline until around 1960. 
A lag of this sort between the inception of mortality and fertility decline is 
typical of demographic transitions, although the length of the lag is often 
shorter and there have been some exceptions. During the lag period the rate 
of  population growth accelerates, here from less than a half  percent per 
year to over 2 percent per year, and then decelerates after fertility begins its 
decline. Population size rises markedly, here by a factor of fi ve or six from 
1900 to the present, with substantially more increase yet to come.
The last panel in the fi gure summarizes the changes in the age distribu-
tions by plotting the youth and old age dependency ratios, defi ned con-
ventionally as the ratio of the populations aged zero to fourteen years, or 
sixty- fi ve and over, to the working age population aged fi fteen to sixty- fi ve. 
The fi rst notable change is the rise in the child dependency ratio as mortality 
declines while fertility remains high. As mortality declines, more children 
survive raising the ratio, much as would happen if  fertility were to rise. The 
increase is evidently quite substantial. Only when fertility begins to decline 
after 1960 does the youth dependency and total dependency begin to fall, 
and this decline continues for fi fty to sixty years. This phase of declining 
total dependency corresponds to a rising proportion of the population in the 
working ages that raises per capita income, other things equal, as we will dis-
cuss at length later. This boost to per capita income is called the fi rst demo-
graphic dividend. Around 2015 this phase comes to an end as rising old age 
dependency fi rst oﬀsets and then outweighs the decline in child dependency. 
Population aging now raises total dependency, which continues its ascent 
until 2060 or so in this simulation, which assumes that fertility declines until 
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replacement level at 2.1 births per woman and assumes that mortality decline 
ceases when a life expectancy of eighty is reached. It is entirely possible that 
fertility might continue to decline to the lower levels seen throughout much 
of East Asia, and that life expectancy may continue to rise, so that popu-
lation aging continues to rise to higher levels more similar to those expected 
for Japan and Korea.
We will be considering some of the consequences of this series of demo-
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Fig. 1.1  A classic demographic transition, India 1890 to 2100, historical, projected 
and simulated
Notes: The simulation is based on a fertility transition in which the total fertility rate follows 
a quintic path declining from 5.9 in 1953 to 2.1 in 2025 and a mortality transition in which a 
Lee- Carter mortality index follows a sinusoidal path as e(0) increases from 24.7 in 1900 to 80.0 
in 2100. Actual India data for the period 1891– 1901 to 1941– 1951 are taken from Bhat (1989). 
Actual and projected data are taken from UN (2001).
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graphic changes for economic growth. To summarize, the fi rst dividend 
stage presents an opportunity to convert the transient gains into long term 
progress through investment. Low and declining fertility has been widely 
associated with increased investments in human capital, which is one such 
investment. In various ways, the demographic changes driving the transi-
tion should greatly increase the aggregate demand for wealth, raising saving 
rates and leading to increased capital intensity in the aggregate economy. 
However, this response is not automatic. To the extent that old age consump-
tion is funded through intergenerational transfers—either private, through 
the family, or public, through pension and health care systems—this boost 
to capital accumulation will be diminished. Each of these points provides 
leverage for policy intervention.
Whether countries will rely on transfers or assets to fund the needs of a 
growing elderly population will depend on policies, culture, and institutions. 
As compared with European and Latin American countries, Asia has relied 
less on public Pay- As- You- Go (PAYGO) pension programs, although the 
situation is somewhat diﬀerent in Japan (Ogawa, Mason, Chawla, and Mat-
sukura, chap. 4 in this volume). But health care for the elderly is a large and 
increasing cost that is often heavily subsidized by the public sector. More-
over, familial transfers to the elderly may be very important in Asia, and 
these are similar to PAYGO pension programs in some important respects. 
Thus, aging in Asia may lead to large implicit debts that are shared by tax-
payers and the adult children of elderly.
If  the needs of  a growing elderly population are met through greater 
reliance on life- cycle saving, population aging will lead to an increase both 
in assets and income. Previous studies and the subsequent analysis show 
that through this mechanism, changes in age structure can lead to a second 
demographic dividend—higher standards of living that persist long after 
the favorable eﬀects of the fi rst dividend have ended.
The economic eﬀects are not confi ned by national borders. Divergent 
demographic trends in the region are likely to generate international capital 
fl ows from those countries experiencing the most rapid increase in saving 
rates to countries that are aging more slowly (but have rapidly growing labor 
forces).
Some countries in Asia have experienced very rapid transitions. Japan, 
Korea, China and some members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) are examples of countries in which changes in age struc-
ture are particularly dramatic. Moreover, the timing of the demographic 
transitions varies across the region. Japan is furthest along, while India and 
some ASEAN countries are relatively early in the transition. As a conse-
quence, the impact of age structure for any particular decade varies consid-
erably from country to country. Moreover, the diﬀerences in the transition 
create the demographic divergence that leads to diﬀerences in factor ratios 
with implications for trade, foreign investment, and immigration.
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The remainder of this chapter addresses these issues in more detail. In 
keeping with the approach of this study, we contrast the experiences and 
prospects in Japan, Korea, India, ASEAN, and greater China—consisting 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, and Taiwan (also 
referred to as “China” in the tables and fi gures). Demographic trends are 
discussed in section 1.1.
The economic implications of demographic changes are addressed in sec-
tion 1.2 following the broad outlines discussed in the introduction. We dis-
cuss research on the relationship between population and economics and we 
present a new analysis of how demographic change will infl uence key macro-
economic variables in ASEAN, greater China, India, Japan, and Korea.
1.1   Demographic Change in Asia
1.1.1   Demographic Transition and Population Growth
In the middle of the twentieth century birth rates were high in every Asian 
country but Japan. Death rates had begun to decline in a number of Asian 
countries, leading to more rapid population growth and to increasing pro-
portions of children because the declines in mortality were concentrated at 
young ages. In terms of the transition shown in fi gure 1.1, some of these 
countries in 1950 were in the late stages of rising youth dependency, and 
others were in the stage of fertility decline and the fi rst dividend.
Except in Japan, birth rates were generally around forty births per 1,000 
population between 1950 and 1955, while death rates were as low as ten per 
1,000 population in Japan, and as high as twenty- fi ve per 1,000 in China 
and India (United Nations 2007). The rate of natural increase (RNI), the 
diﬀerence between the birth rate and the death rate, is the rate at which the 
population would grow with no net immigration. The RNI was high between 
1950 and 1955, varying from around 20 to 25; that is, 2 to 2.5 percent per 
year (see fi gure 1.2).
During the next fi fty years death rates declined very substantially. By the 
period from 2000 to 2005, the death rate was near or below ten per 1,000 in 
every country, while birth rates also declined. In some countries the birth rate 
declined by more than the death rate, slowing population growth, but growth 
rates remained near 2 percent per year or more in many countries between 
1975 and 1980. Between 2000 and 2005, however, further declines in the 
birth rate are apparent in fi gure 1.2. In Japan, births and deaths were nearly 
equal during this period. In other countries, population growth ranged from 
near 0 to almost 2 percent per year.
Figure 1.2 also shows United Nations (UN) medium projections through 
2050, which assume that in countries with very low fertility—for example, 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, and Singapore—it will rise in 
the future, and that in countries with relatively high fertility, such as the 
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Philippines and India, it will decline further (UN 2007). The implied varia-
tion in population growth rates lies between minus and plus 1 percent per 
year. Death rates will rise moderately in many countries as their popula-
tions age.
The broad outlines of the demographic transition are similar across Asia, 
but speed and timing vary. The transition began fi rst in Japan, then in other 
East and Southeast Asian countries, and more recently in some ASEAN 
countries and India. It has been very rapid in Korea and China as compared 
with countries elsewhere in Asia, other parts of the developing world, or in 
Western countries.
Population growth rates are reported for ASEAN, greater China, India, 
Japan, and Korea in table 1.1. Between 2000 and 2005, Japan’s population 
growth was almost zero. The PRC and Taiwan had population growth rates 
well below 1 percent per annum. Among the ASEAN countries, only Thai-
land and Myanmar were growing at less than 1 percent per annum. Two 
Asian countries had growth rates that would have been well below 10 were 
it not for substantial rates of  immigration—Singapore and Hong Kong, 
China. The population growth rates between the years 2000 and 2005 of 
other ASEAN countries vary from 1.3 percent in Indonesia to 2.3 percent 
in Brunei. India’s growth rate is moderately high at 1.6 percent per year for 
the period from 2000 to 2005.
Because of  diﬀerences in population growth rates, the populations of 
ASEAN and India are increasing relative to China, Japan, and Korea. 
Fig. 1.2  Birth rates and death rates for ASEAN and selected Asian countries, 
1950– 1955, 1975– 1980, 2000– 2005, 2025– 2030, and 2045– 2050
Source: Based on data from United Nations Population Division (2007).
Notes: The RNI is rate of natural increase per 1,000 persons. ASEAN is a simple average of 
country values.
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India’s population is projected to exceed greater China’s population by 2030 
(fi gures 1.3 and 1.4).
1.1.2   Population Age Structure
Population age structure changes in a very predictable way over the demo-
graphic transition. Early in the transition, the percent of children increases 
as infant and child mortality declines, as we saw in fi gure 1.1. Later, the child 
share declines and the percent in the working ages increases. In the fi nal 
stages, the share of the working age population declines while the share at 
old ages increases.
The rise in the child share of the population occurred in ASEAN, China, 
and India between 1950 and 1975. In ASEAN, for example, the percent 
under age twenty increased from 49.0 percent to 53.0 percent (table 1.2). The 
decline in the proportion under age twenty has been extraordinarily rapid in 
some Asian countries such as greater China and Korea. In 1975, just over 50 
percent of Korea’s population consisted of children under the age of twenty. 
The projected value for 2025 is 16.8 percent.
The low level refl ects the fact that Korea has among the lowest total fertil-
ity rates of any country in the world. Other countries in which the child share 
Table 1.1 Population growth rates (%), 1950–2050
  1950–1955 1975–1980 2000–2005 2025–2010 2045–2050
ASEAN 2.10 2.14 1.39 0.69 0.19
  Brunei Darussalam 5.56 3.65 2.29 1.28 0.78
  Cambodia 2.15 –1.01 1.76 1.26 0.77
  Indonesia 1.67 2.20 1.31 0.61 0.10
  Lao PDR 2.73 1.30 1.62 1.08 0.50
  Malaysia 2.72 2.32 1.95 0.87 0.41
  Myanmar 1.96 2.19 0.89 0.47 0.01
  Philippines 2.99 2.70 2.08 1.09 0.50
  Singapore 4.90 1.30 1.49 0.38 –0.37
  Thailand 2.84 2.08 0.76 0.12 –0.27
  Viet Nam 1.87 1.99 1.45 0.75 0.21
CHINA  1.90 1.49 0.67 0.17 –0.32
  China, People’s Rep. of 1.87 1.48 0.67 0.17 –0.32
  Hong Kong, China 4.64 2.73 1.15 0.54 0.11
  Taiwan 3.63 1.95 0.54 –0.06 –0.89
  India 1.73 2.30 1.62 0.79 0.32
  Japan 1.43 0.93 0.14 –0.56 –0.78
  Korea, Rep. of  2.55  1.55  0.46  –0.25  –0.89
Source: United Nations Population Prospects, 2006. Taiwan: Council for Economic Planning 
and Development, China, “Population Projections for Taiwan Areas: 2008–2056.”
Notes: Values for ASEAN and China  are for the combined populations, not simple average 
across the group members.
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is expected to drop to very low levels over the coming decades are Singapore, 
China, Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, and Japan.
The percentage of the population in the working ages, defi ned here as 
those between ages twenty and sixty- four inclusive, increased between 1975 
and 2000 in every member of greater China, India, Japan, Korea, and every 
ASEAN country but Cambodia and Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(PDR). The percentage reached 60 percent or more in Singapore, Thailand, 
greater China, Japan, and Korea. These countries are at or near the peak and 
will not experience any substantial change in the share of their working- age 
population between 2000 and 2025. Japan is an exception and it will experi-
ence a signifi cant decline in the working- age share and size (table 1.3).
The largest increases in the working- age populations are occurring in 
ASEAN and India. Between 2000 and 2025 the working- age share will 
increase 7 percentage points in ASEAN and almost 9 percentage points in 
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Fig. 1.3  Regional distribution of population for major country groupings, 2000
Source: See text.
Fig. 1.4  Regional distribution of population for major country groupings, 2050
Source: See text.
Table 1.2 Percentage of population under age twenty, 1950–2050
  1950  1975  2000  2025  2050
ASEAN 49.0 53.0 41.8 30.3 24.1
  Brunei Darussalam 46.0 50.5 40.0 29.6 24.7
  Cambodia 52.6 52.8 54.3 39.0 29.4
  Indonesia 50.0 52.3 40.6 28.9 23.6
  Lao PDR 49.5 54.3 54.1 38.7 26.9
  Malaysia 50.4 53.2 43.6 31.7 24.5
  Myanmar 44.3 51.7 40.4 27.9 23.0
  Philippines 53.7 55.4 48.4 37.3 26.6
  Singapore 50.0 45.7 28.1 16.4 15.5
  Thailand 53.0 53.3 32.1 24.4 21.4
  Viet Nam 41.9 53.8 44.1 29.4 23.1
CHINA  43.4 48.8 32.8 23.7 20.5
  China, People’s Rep. of 43.3 48.9 32.9 23.8 20.5
  Hong Kong, China 41.2 42.3 23.7 15.7 15.2
  Taiwan 52.5 47.4 29.7 20.6 18.6
  India 47.7 50.6 45.1 33.3 24.4
  Japan 45.8 31.5 20.5 15.5 15.3
  Korea, Rep. of  51.7  50.3  28.9  16.8  14.2
Source: United Nations Population Prospects, 2006. Taiwan: Council for Economic Planning 
and Development, “Population Projections for Taiwan Areas: 2008–2056.”
Table 1.3 Percentage of population aged twenty to sixty- four, 1950–2050
  1950  1975  2000  2025  2050
ASEAN 47.2 43.4 53.3 60.6 58.3
  Brunei Darussalam 49.2 46.0 57.0 62.8 60.5
  Cambodia 44.7 44.4 42.7 56.0 60.9
  Indonesia 46.1 44.4 54.5 62.1 57.8
  Lao PDR 48.4 42.7 42.5 56.5 62.5
  Malaysia 44.6 43.0 52.5 59.6 59.2
  Myanmar 52.3 44.0 54.1 62.9 58.1
  Philippines 42.7 41.6 48.0 56.3 60.4
  Singapore 47.6 50.1 64.8 60.8 51.7
  Thailand 43.8 43.1 61.2 60.7 55.3
  Viet Nam 53.9 41.3 50.5 61.9 57.7
CHINA  52.1 46.8 60.3 62.5 55.7
  China, People’s Rep. of 52.2 46.7 60.3 62.5 55.8
  Hong Kong, China 56.3 52.3 65.4 62.6 52.1
  Taiwan 45.0 49.2 62.1 62.3 55.5
  India 49.2 46.0 50.3 58.9 61.1
  Japan 49.3 60.6 62.2 55.1 47.0
  Korea, Rep. of  45.2  46.1  63.7  63.6  50.6
Source: United Nations Population Prospects, 2006. Taiwan: Council for Economic Planning 
and Development, “Population Projections for Taiwan Areas: 2008–2056.”
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India. Within ASEAN, the gains will be dramatic in Cambodia (13 points), 
Lao PDR (14 points), and Vietnam (11 points).
Population aging is coming very rapidly to the countries of East Asia. 
Japan, with the percentage of people aged sixty- fi ve and older increasing 
from 17.2 in 2000 to 29.5 in 2025, has the oldest population in the world. 
The percentage sixty- fi ve and older will double between 2000 and 2025 in 
greater China, from 6.9 percent to 13.8 percent, and in Thailand, from 6.7 
percent to 14.9 percent. Even more rapid aging will occur in Singapore and 
Korea where 22.8 percent and 19.6 percent of the populations are projected 
to be sixty- fi ve and older by 2025 (table 1.4).
Elsewhere, the share of the population aged sixty- fi ve and older will not 
reach 10 percent until after 2025. By 2050, however, the ASEAN share is 
projected to reach 17.7 percent and India’s share 14.5 percent. At fi rst glance 
demographic characteristics in 2050 may appear to be remote to the eco-
nomic concerns of today. Nothing could be further from the truth, however. 
The elderly population of  2050 is the working population of  today. The 
prospect of old- age and retirement will infl uence current behavior—with 
respect to saving, for example. Moreover, policies implemented by govern-
ments today will determine the success with which the working population 
of today can adequately prepare for an extended period of old age, and the 
ways in which they prepare.
Table 1.4 Percentage of population sixty- fi ve and older, 1950–2050
  1950 1975 2000 2025 2050
ASEAN 3.8 3.6 4.9 9.1 17.7
  Brunei Darussalam 4.9 3.5 2.9 7.6 14.8
  Cambodia 2.7 2.8 2.9 5.0 9.8
  Indonesia 4.0 3.3 4.9 9.0 18.6
  Lao PDR 2.2 3.1 3.4 4.7 10.6
  Malaysia 5.1 3.7 3.9 8.7 16.3
  Myanmar 3.4 4.2 5.5 9.3 18.9
  Philippines 3.6 3.1 3.5 6.5 12.9
  Singapore 2.4 4.1 7.2 22.8 32.8
  Thailand 3.2 3.6 6.7 14.9 23.3
  Viet Nam 4.2 4.9 5.5 8.7 19.2
CHINA  4.4 4.4 6.9 13.8 23.8
  China, People’s Rep. of 4.5 4.4 6.8 13.7 23.7
  Hong Kong, China 2.5 5.4 11.0 21.7 32.6
  Taiwan 2.4 3.4 8.1 17.2 25.9
  India 3.1 3.4 4.6 7.7 14.5
  Japan 4.9 7.9 17.2 29.5 37.7
  Korea, Rep. of  3.0  3.6  7.4  19.6  35.1
Source: United Nations Population Prospects, 2006. Taiwan: Council for Economic Planning 
and Development, “Population Projections for Taiwan Areas: 2008–2056.”
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1.1.3   Role of Immigration
Immigration plays a relatively modest role in determining population 
growth and age structure in Asia as compared with births and deaths. Immi-
grant fl ows are heavily regulated and limited—mostly by receiving countries. 
With a few exceptions, the countries of Asia have not opened their borders to 
immigrants, and there is little to suggest that will change soon irrespective of 
economic or demographic pressures that may emerge in the coming years.1
Asia’s largest countries are net sending countries. Net migration from 
India, China, Indonesia, and the Philippines has consistently been negative 
(outward). The rate of net migration is quite small in India and China and, 
thus, has little eﬀect on the size of their national populations. Between 2000 
and 2005, for example, China lost 0.03 percent per year of its population, 
and India lost 0.02 percent per year of its population due to immigration. 
The rate of out- migration from Indonesia and the Philippines is relatively 
great as compared with most other countries, at – 0.09 percent per year in 
Indonesia and –0.22 percent per year in the Philippines. But even in these 
two countries, the impact on the growth of the population in any year is 
modest (table 1.5).
These four countries do contribute relatively large shares to global migra-
tion fl ows because their populations are so large. For 2000 to 2005 the annual 
net numbers of immigrants were 390,000 from China, 280,000 from India, 
200,000 from Indonesia, and 180,000 from the Philippines. Combined, they 
contributed just over one million net immigrants a year to the global fl ow. 
This compares with a total outfl ow of 2.6 million per year from the less 
developed regions to the more developed regions of the world during the 
same period.
For the most part these immigrants were not moving to other Asian 
countries. Total net infl ows, including immigrants from outside Asia, were 
approximately 100,000 immigrants per year to the net receiving countries 
of ASEAN, 60,000 per year for Hong Kong, and only 54,000 per year for 
Japan.
For a few countries in the region migration is signifi cant relative to their 
domestic populations. The Philippines has sustained immigrant outfl ows at 
a signifi cant level for many years. As a consequence, remittances are cur-
rently about 13 percent of  gross domestic product (GDP). Hong Kong, 
 Brunei, and Singapore have actively encouraged immigration to their coun-
tries. Over 40 percent of  Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s populations, and 
one- third of Brunei’s population are immigrants.
Japan falls at the other end of the immigration spectrum with its rela-
tively closed borders. Given the high wages of its workers relative to those 
1. Estimates presented in this section are all drawn from two sources: United Nations (2006, 
2007).
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of its neighbors and the declining numbers in the working ages, one might 
well expect substantial immigration into Japan. Currently about two million 
immigrants live in Japan or, 1.6 percent of its population. This compares 
with an immigrant share for the more developed regions of the world of 9.5 
percent and a fi gure of 12.9 percent for the U.S. population.
1.2   Economic and Social Implications
Demographic change in general, and the demographic transition in par-
ticular, has three broad kinds of economic consequence. First, the support 
ratio is altered, such that output produced by the working age population 
must be shared with diﬀering numbers of children and elderly. During the 
phase of the transition when fertility is falling, rising support ratios boost 
the growth rate of per capita income or consumption, other things equal, 
and this is called the “fi rst demographic dividend.” Second, the process of 
capital accumulation is aﬀected, since both longer life and fewer children 
lead to higher savings in preparation for retirement, while population aging 
increases the relative number of wealth- holding elderly in the population. 
The combined eﬀect raises the aggregate capital- labor ratio and therefore 
labor productivity, generating the so- called “second demographic dividend.” 
However, the extent to which this happens depends on the extent to which 
income of the elderly is derived from public or familial transfers, rather than 
private saving, and the degree of openness of the economy infl uences the 
extent to which labor productivity is raised domestically or in other coun-
tries. In any event, although the capital- labor ratio increases, the rate of sav-
ing out of GDP may decrease as populations age. Third, both lower fertility 
and higher survival lead to increased human capital investment per child. 
While the support ratio falls, rises, and then falls again over the demographic 
transition, the accumulation of physical and human capital per capita rises 
permanently, at least once fertility begins to fall. We will consider each of 
these three kinds of eﬀects in more detail, drawing on information about the 
economic life cycle for various Asian countries from the National Transfer 
Accounts (NTA) project.2
Population change has important implications for individual countries, 
but also for regional economies and regional integration. First, national 
and regional populations are growing at very diﬀerent rates, with India and 
ASEAN increasing relative to greater China, Japan, and Korea. Inevitably 
changes in the size of populations infl uence the size of regional economies. 
More people means more consumers, more workers, and more savers and 
2. The National Transfer Accounts (NTA) project uses new methods to construct mea-
sures of the fl ows of resources across ages through the public sector and through the private 
sector, including within families. Estimates are consistent with National Income and Product 
Accounts. Currently, twenty- eight countries in Asia, the Americas, Europe, and Africa are 
participating in the project. More information is available at www.ntaccounts.org.
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investors. The extent to which larger populations result in greater aggregate 
consumption, aggregate earners, aggregate saving, and investment will be 
infl uenced by a host of  factors beyond the size of  national and regional 
populations. Nonetheless, population size is an important consideration.
National and regional diﬀerences in the growth of consumer demand, 
labor forces, and aggregate saving and investment will infl uence interna-
tional fl ows of workers, goods and services, and capital. The classic approach 
to this issue is that international fl ows arise in response to international 
diﬀerences in relative factor endowments (Deardorﬀ 1987). In this context 
a key issue is whether divergent population trends lead to divergent factor 
endowments.
The impact of divergent factor endowments will depend to a great extent 
on the institutional context. Divergent capital- labor ratios can lead to immi-
gration, capital fl ows, and/ or trade depending on the policy context. As 
should be clear from the brief  description in the preceding section, inter-
national labor fl ows are relatively limited in Asia. In the absence of radical 
changes in policy, population aging is more likely to infl uence international 
capital fl ows and trade than immigration.
1.2.1   The Economic Life Cycle
The economic life cycle is fundamental to understanding the relationship 
between population age structure and the economy. In all populations there 
are extended periods of dependency. Children consume more resources than 
they produce through their own labor and must rely heavily on intergenera-
tional transfers from their parents (and grandparents), and from taxpayers. 
The elderly also consume more than they produce. They rely on intergen-
erational familial and public transfers, but also on personal assets to fi ll the 
gap between what they consume and what they produce through their own 
labors.
Figure 1.5 is an estimate of the economic life cycle based on analysis of 
consumption and labor income data for four developing economies. The 
fi gure is a cross- sectional profi le constructed from per capita measures of 
labor income and consumption by single year of age. The values are nor-
malized on average labor income of adults aged thirty through forty- nine. 
Labor income includes all pretax returns to labor: earnings, benefi ts, and 
self- employment income estimated as a proportion of the operating sur-
plus or mixed income of the household sector. The age profi les are based 
on nationally representative household surveys of income and adjusted to 
match National Income Account data.
Labor income is a composite. It includes the labor income of both men 
and women. It is infl uenced by labor force participation rates, by variation 
in hours worked, and by variation in wages for employees and productivity 
for the self- employed. Earnings, which can be measured with relative accu-
racy, is a dominant share of labor income in developed countries. However, 
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self- employment income, which is poorly measured, is a substantially large 
share of labor income in low- income countries.
Consumption includes both public and private consumption. Private 
consumption of health, education, and other goods and services has been 
estimated separately using nationally representative surveys of consump-
tion. Public consumption has also been estimated separately for education, 
health, and other publicly provided goods and services. Private and public 
consumption have also been adjusted to match National Income and Prod-
uct Accounts (NIPA) values.3
One must avoid interpreting these fi gures as longitudinal or cohort pro-
fi les rather than as cross- sectional profi les. In a growing economy with these 
cross- sectional profi les, labor income will rise more steeply for young co-
horts, peak at a later age, and decline more slowly for the elderly. Consump-
tion will not be fl at for a cohort—rather it will rise with age at a rate roughly 
equal to the rate of aggregate per capita consumption growth.
The age at which children become economically independent is surpris-
ingly old. Children under age twenty- fi ve are producing less than they con-
sume. Likewise, old age dependency occurs at a surprisingly early age. Those 
aged sixty and older are producing less from their labor than they consume. 
The life- cycle surplus is confi ned to thirty- four years—from ages twenty-
 fi ve to fi fty- nine.
The extent of  dependency varies across the dependent ages, however. 
Those in their early twenties are producing almost as much as they consume; 
as are those in their early sixties. Young children produce nothing, but they 
also consume much less than a teenager or someone over the age of sixty.
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Fig. 1.5  The economic life cycle, developing world profi le
Source: Lee and Mason (2007).
3. Detailed information about the methodology is available in Lee, Lee, and Mason (2008).
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An important issue is whether the economic life cycle is changing over 
time, how it is changing, and whether it is susceptible to policy. The poten-
tial for policy intervention is discussed in the conclusion to the chapter. An 
important possibility that is widely discussed is that the age at retirement will 
increase as health improves and life expectancy rises. This may happen, and 
in a few industrial countries—including the United States—labor force par-
ticipation rates have risen slightly at older ages in recent years. For the most 
part, however, the age at retirement has declined dramatically around the 
world, although Japan has been diﬀerent. The labor income profi le for the 
United States and Taiwan have become increasingly concentrated, declining 
for both the young and the old relative to prime age adults. Another possibil-
ity is that the consumption side of the economic life cycle will change. Our 
preliminary analysis suggests that this may be occurring—consumption is 
rising most steeply at older ages in the industrial countries and particularly 
in the United States, consumption of the elderly has increased very sharply. 
In the following analysis we abstract from these changes. If  we were to incor-
porate them, however, they would reinforce our conclusions.
The subsequent sections will make extensive use of  the economic life 
cycle to provide a more refi ned measure of how changes in population age 
structure will infl uence trends in consumption, labor, and their magnitudes 
relative to one another.
1.2.2   The First Dividend
Recent studies on the macroeconomic eﬀects of population age structure 
are based on growth models that explicitly incorporate population age struc-
ture. The simplest form for these models distinguishes two components of 
per capita income:
(1) 
Y

N
  
L

N
 
Y

L
.
The exact defi nitions of the terms vary across studies, but broadly speaking 
Y/ N is per capita income, L/ N is the share of the population in the working 
ages—also called the support ratio, and Y/ L is income per worker or work-
ing age person. Letting gr represent the growth rate, equation (1) can also 
be expressed as:
(2) grYN   gr LN   grYL .
Equation (2) identifi es two channels through which population can infl u-
ence per capita income. First, the support ratio varies with changes in the 
population age structure. Given the rate of growth in Y/ L, a 1 percentage 
point increase in the support ratio yields a 1 percentage point increase in per 
capita income. This eﬀect is referred to as the accounting eﬀect or the fi rst 
dividend. Note that equation (2) is an identity and, hence, given output per 
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eﬀective producer, changes in the support ratio must produce point- for-
 point changes in output per eﬀective consumer. A comprehensive under-
standing requires that we explore the second channel, as well: how changes 
in population age structure, other population changes, and nondemographic 
factors infl uence productivity growth, in other words, the growth of Y/ L.
Elaborations on this simple formulation have been used to study popu-
lation and economic growth using three approaches. First, aggregate panel 
data have been used to estimate growth models, usually adapting equation 
(2) to a Barro- type growth framework (Kelley and Schmidt 1995; Bloom 
and Williamson 1998; Bloom and Canning 2001; Kelley and Schmidt 2001; 
Kelley and Schmidt 2007). A second approach relies on growth accounting 
methods (Mason 2001). A third method uses simulation modeling (Cutler 
et al. 1990; Mason 2005; Attanasio et al. 2006; Mason and Lee 2006; Mason 
2007).
A simple refi nement of this formulation incorporates the age variation 
in the economic life cycle into the calculation of the support ratio. In this 
formulation, L is the eﬀective labor force calculated using the age- profi le of 
labor income to weight the population age distribution. The eﬀective labor 
force then incorporates age variation in labor force participation, hours 
worked, and productivity. The denominator N should also incorporate age 
variation in consumption to measure the eﬀective number of consumers. 
Thus, if  income per eﬀective consumer, Y/ N, increases by 1 percent, the per 
capita age profi le of consumption in fi gure 1.5 can increase by 1 percent 
holding the consumption ratio (the ratio of aggregate consumption to na-
tional income) constant. To be explicit, the eﬀective number of producers, 
L, and the eﬀective number of consumers, N, are defi ned to be:
(3) L(t)  ∑
x
(x)P(x, t)
N(t)  ∑
x
(x)P(x, t),
where P(x, t) is the population aged x in year t, (x) is the age- profi le of labor 
income, and (x) is the age- profi le of consumption. Both age- profi les are held 
constant over time.4 The support ratio is defi ned as the ratio L(t)/ N(t).
The economic support ratio for fi ve countries/ groups from 1950 to 2050 
is plotted in fi gure 1.6. Japan’s support ratio has peaked and is beginning to 
decline, but for all others in Asia the economic support ratio is rising and 
thus contributing to more rapid growth in income per eﬀective consumer. 
The impact of the economic support ratio does not depend on its level; its 
eﬀect on income per eﬀective consumer—the fi rst dividend—is equal to the 
growth rate of the support ratio (fi gure 1.7).
Figure 1.7 presents the fi rst dividend for 1990 to 2025. In the early 1990s 
4. An interesting and important question is how the economic life- cycle changes over time 
and how that will infl uence the analysis presented here.
36    Andrew Mason, Ronald Lee, and Sang-Hyop Lee
the fi rst dividend was turning negative in Japan, increasingly so as time pro-
gressed. By 2025 the decline in the economic support ratio will be depressing 
growth in income per eﬀective consumer by 0.5 percent per year.
The experiences of  greater China and Korea are similar with the fi rst 
dividend, marginally larger in greater China in each year. In the early 1990s, 
the fi rst dividend added about 1 percent per year to growth in income per 
eﬀective consumer. The impact has declined steadily. It is still positive, but 
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Fig. 1.6  Economic support ratio, country groupings, 1950– 2050
Source: Calculated by authors.
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Fig. 1.7  The fi rst demographic dividend (%), 1990– 2025, country groupings
Source: Calculated by authors.
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will soon disappear and after 2020 will depress growth by 0.5 percent per 
year. In India and ASEAN the dividend is positive for the entire thirty- fi ve 
year period. Currently, the increase in the economic support ratio is adding 
approximately 0.5 percent per year to growth in income per eﬀective con-
sumer. Over the period 1990 to 2025, the fi rst dividend has raised income 
per eﬀective consumer in total by 21 percent in ASEAN and by 18 percent 
in India.
Changes in the economic support ratio emphasize the implications of 
population age structure for per capita values. The changes in total num-
ber of  eﬀective consumers and producers are also of  interest because of 
their implications for trade, capital fl ows, and immigration. The most rapid 
growth in the eﬀective number of consumers is in ASEAN and India. For the 
period from 2005 to 2010, the annual growth rate in the eﬀective number of 
consumers is 1.4 percent per annum in ASEAN and 1.7 percent per annum 
in India. The eﬀective number of consumers is growing much more slowly 
in China and Korea and declining slowly in Japan (table 1.6).
Currently, the eﬀective number of  producers is growing more rapidly 
than the eﬀective number of consumers except in Japan. The growth rate is 
about 2 percent per annum in ASEAN and India, 1 percent in greater China, 
0.7 percent per annum in Korea, and declining by 0.4 percent per annum 
in Japan.
The regional diﬀerences in growth rates may seem small but their cumula-
tive eﬀect is not because they are persistent. The coming decades will see a 
signifi cant shift to the West and to the South. India will supplant China as 
the largest country in terms of eﬀective number of consumers and eﬀective 
number of  producers. The ASEAN’s share will grow to approach about 
20 percent by 2050. Japan and Korea will shrink relative to their neighbors. 
Korea’s share of eﬀective producers will be cut in half  by 2050, and Japan’s 
by over 60 percent (table 1.7).
Table 1.6 Annual growth rates (%), eﬀective numbers of consumers and producers
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Eﬀective consumers
  ASEAN 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.9
  China  1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3
  India 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1
  Japan 0.5 0.3 0.1 –0.1 –0.2 –0.3 –0.5
  Korea, Rep. of 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 –0.1
Eﬀective producers
  ASEAN 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.3 1.0
  China  2.4 1.9 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.3 –0.2
  India 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
  Japan 0.5 0.2 –0.1 –0.4 –0.6 –0.7 –0.8
  Korea, Rep. of  2.2  1.6  1.2  0.7  0.2  –0.2  –0.7
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The fi rst dividend depends entirely on changes in the size of the eﬀective 
workforce relative to the population (or the eﬀective number of consumers). 
Output and income per working- age adult are held constant and, hence, 
the possible eﬀects of population growth or changing age structure on the 
second component in the basic growth identity, equation (2), are set aside. 
In the next sections we explore the possibility that demographic trends are 
infl uencing income per eﬀective worker.
There are many potentially important channels through which produc-
tivity may be infl uenced by population. We will consider two important 
ones: the accumulation of human capital and the accumulation of physical 
capital, with our emphasis on the latter.
Human Capital Formation
In Becker’s quantity- quality trade- oﬀ theory (1991), one possible expla-
nation for fertility decline is that rising incomes lead couples to choose to 
invest so much more per child that they also choose to have fewer children. 
But within that theory there are also other possibilities. Newly available 
contraceptives raise the price of quantity by disconnecting fertility from sex, 
and could thereby reduce fertility and raise investments per child through 
a complex interaction. New public education or cheaper transportation to 
existing schools could reduce the price of quality, raising investments and 
reducing numbers of children. Mortality decline or economic development 
would both raise rates of return to education and thereby could lead couples 
to choose quality over quantity. In all these cases we would expect to observe 
an inverse relationship between quantity and quality refl ecting movements 
along the hyperbolic budget constraint, although the causal forces at work 
would be quite diﬀerent.
Table 1.7 Distribution of eﬀective consumers and producers
   1990  2025  2050  
Eﬀective consumers
  ASEAN 16.4 18.0 19.0
  China  45.3 39.5 36.0
  India 31.7 37.8 41.4
  Japan 4.9 3.3 2.6
  Korea, Rep. of 1.7 1.3 1.1
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Eﬀective producers
  ASEAN 15.4 18.1 19.1
  China  47.2 40.5 34.3
  India 29.9 37.0 43.5
  Japan 5.7 3.0 2.2
  Korea, Rep. of 1.8 1.4 0.9
   Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
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Some theories assign a central role to human capital. For example, Becker, 
Murphy, and Tamura (1990) make output of consumption goods propor-
tional to the stock of human capital (constant returns), and human capital 
per child proportional to the human capital of the parent generation. If  this 
growth model escapes a Malthusian trap, then it converges to a steady state 
growth path with constant fertility, growing human capital per person, and 
a growing rate of return to human capital.
Using data from National Transfer Accounts, we have constructed a mea-
sure of  investment in children’s human capital. We begin with measures 
of public and private spending on children’s health and education at each 
age. We then sum these across age up to eighteen years for health and up 
to twenty- six years for education. This sum measures total human capital 
investment per child, in a cross- sectional synthetic cohort sense. To nor-
malize these measures to facilitate comparison across countries, we then 
divide by the average level of labor income from ages thirty to forty- nine, as 
before. The natural logarithm of this ratio is then compared to the logarithm 
of the Total Fertility Rate, which is also a cross- sectional synthetic cohort 
measure.
The result is plotted in fi gure 1.8, which shows a strong inverse association 
across countries between human capital investment per child and the level 
of fertility. The elasticity is – 1.3, indicating that couples in countries with 
lower fertility actually spend a higher proportion of their labor income on 
human capital investments than do couples in the countries with higher fer-
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tility. When countries outside of Asia are included, however, this elasticity is 
indistinguishable from unity (Lee and Mason 2009). The inverse association 
displayed in fi gure 1.8 can be viewed as a kind of meta budget constraint for 
quantity- quality, an interpretation developed in Lee and Mason (2009).
Although fi gure 1.8 shows a cross- sectional rather than a longitudinal 
relationship, it suggests that fertility decline in Asia has been accompanied 
by a sharp increase in investment per child relative to family resources. 
We would expect an increase of  this sort to raise labor productivity and 
contribute powerfully to economic growth, a process that is modeled and 
explored in Lee and Mason (2009). Here, however, we will simply note that 
this rising level of investment may have been rooted in declining fertility and 
must surely have contributed importantly to rising labor productivity and 
economic growth.
Physical Capital Accumulation and the Second Dividend
A fundamental result that follows from the neoclassical growth model is 
that for a given saving rate, slower population growth or slower growth in 
the eﬀective labor force leads to capital deepening and an increase in output 
per worker (Solow 1956). When the workforce grows more rapidly, a larger 
share of current investment must be devoted to providing capital to new 
workers (capital widening). Less is available for increasing capital per worker 
(capital deepening). The steady state capital output ratio (K / Y) depends only 
on the saving rate (s), the rate of population growth (n), and technological 
change () (if  we ignore depreciation): K / Y  s/ (n  ). Any decline in the 
population growth rate leads to a rise in the capital output ratio.
This is an important point because the decline in the economic support 
ratio at the end of the demographic transition is a direct result of slower 
growth in the labor force. The fi rst dividend turns negative, but, given a 
constant saving rate, output per worker will rise. Hence, population aging 
may lead to higher—not lower—per capita income. Indeed, this was the 
conclusion reached by Cutler et al. (1990) in their analysis of U.S. aging.
Given the objective of  this analysis, two assumptions underlying the 
simple neoclassical growth model are unattractive: that the saving rate is 
exogenous and that the economy is closed.
The life cycle saving model is widely used to analyze the eﬀects of popu-
lation and other factors on saving (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954; Modigli-
ani 1988) and capital (Tobin 1967). In the classic life cycle model, individuals 
save when they are young and dissave during their retirement years. Thus, 
given the age profi le of saving, an increase in the old- age population leads 
to lower aggregate saving. A lower saving rate does not unambiguously lead 
to a decline in capital because of the capital deepening eﬀect. If  n and s both 
decline, K / Y may increase or fall.
The validity of the life cycle model is widely debated. Factors other than 
the desire to provide for old age may motivate saving. The bequest motive 
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may infl uence saving, in addition to life cycle saving, but neither we nor 
others know how the motivation to bequeath varies with fertility or other 
demographic factors. Hurd (1987) fi nds that the bequest behavior of  in-
dividuals with and without children is similar, suggesting either that be-
quests are mainly unintended or that saving for bequests may be motivated 
by others besides one’s own children (Kuehlwein 1993). Old age support 
may be provided through public or through familial support. Models esti-
mated using aggregate data support very large eﬀects of age structure (Kel-
ley and Schmidt 1996; Higgins and Williamson 1997; Williamson and Hig-
gins 2001). Models based on survey data suggest more modest infl uences 
from age structure (Deaton and Paxson 2000). Simulation models imply that 
age structure has an important eﬀect, but one that is smaller than found in 
aggregate empirical work (Lee et al. 2000).
A potentially important elaboration on the life cycle model incorporates 
the eﬀects of life expectancy on the age profi le of saving in addition to the 
composition of  the population. People are living longer and, hence, the 
duration of their retirement is longer. Although a possible response would 
be to retire at a later age, this has not occurred for reasons that are not 
entirely understood. Several recent studies have found support for a strong 
positive life expectancy eﬀect on aggregate saving rates (Bloom et al. 2003; 
Kinugasa 2004; Kinugasa and Mason 2007). Fertility decline may also have 
a signifi cant eﬀect on saving. A number of studies have concluded that popu-
lations with high child dependency have lower saving rates (Mason 1987; 
Higgins 1994; Kelley and Schmidt 1996).
Transfers also play an important role. In principal, old age consumption 
can be fi nanced entirely through intergenerational transfers, as in Samu-
elson’s consumption- loan economy (Samuelson 1958). More realistically, 
intergenerational transfers vary in their importance from country to coun-
try. Some countries rely heavily on PAYGO public pension programs. Other 
countries rely heavily on familial support systems, although much less is 
known about this form of intergenerational transfer and its implication for 
saving.
A high percentage of  elderly and adult children live together in most 
Asian countries. In Japan and Korea the extent of coresidence has declined 
substantially in recent decades. Moreover, young adults have much lower 
expectations about receiving old- age support in the future than was previ-
ously the case (Ogawa and Retherford 1993). Coresidence, however, does not 
provide a clear guide to the magnitude or direction of familial transfers.
National Transfer Accounts provide comprehensive estimates of the im-
portance of assets and intergenerational transfers, both public and familial, 
for a few countries. Figure 1.9 provides estimates for Japan, Taiwan, Thai-
land and the United States of the fraction of the life cycle defi cit (consump-
tion less labor income) of those sixty- fi ve and older funded by familial trans-
fers, public transfers, and assets (asset income and dissaving combined). The 
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elderly in Taiwan and Japan both depend heavily on transfers—covering 
almost two- thirds of their life cycle defi cits. Taiwan is much more heavily 
dependent on family transfers and Japan on public transfers, but in total 
they rely heavily on combined transfers. They rely on assets to cover roughly 
one- third of their life cycle defi cits. In contrast, the United States and Thai-
land depend on transfers for roughly one- third of their life cycle defi cit. 
Thailand depends more on family transfers and the United States on public 
transfers, but their total dependence on combined transfers is similar. Thai-
land and the United States rely much more on assets to cover their life cycle 
defi cits than do Japan and Taiwan.
That U.S. elderly depend more on assets for their retirement than Japa-
nese elderly may seem surprising given that Japanese saving rates are higher 
than U.S. saving rates. The estimates are constructed to insure consistency 
with NIPA estimates of saving. There are many possible explanations of 
the seeming inconsistency, however. This is a snapshot of the use of assets 
to support retirement by the elderly. Aggregate saving rates also depend on 
the saving behavior of nonelderly adults. Moreover, the estimates presented 
in fi gure 1.9 address only the life cycle use of saving and not other motives; 
for example, the bequest motive.
Because comprehensive measures of familial transfers are just becoming 
available, there are no empirical studies of their eﬀect on aggregate saving 
rates. But Lee, Mason, and Miller (2000, 2002, 2003) use a simulation model 
Assets
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Transfer
Family 
Transfer
2/3 1/3
1/3
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U.S. 2003
Japan 2004 
Taiwan 1998 
Thailand 2004
Fig. 1.9  Proportion of life cycle defi cit of those sixty- fi ve and older funded 
through familial transfers, public transfers, and asset- based reallocations (asset 
income and dis- saving)
Notes: Selected Asian countries and the United States. Computational details available at 
www.ntaccounts.org. Estimates from the National Transfer Accounts Project. Japan estimates 
constructed by Naohiro Ogawa, Rikiya Matsukura, and Amonthep Chawla. Thai estimates 
constructed by Chawla. Information about Taiwan and U.S. estimates available in Mason 
et al. (2009).
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to explore their potential eﬀect on aggregate saving. In their analysis of 
Taiwan, they fi nd that changes in age structure and life expectancy alone 
can account for only a portion of the rise in aggregate saving rates that ac-
companied its demographic transition. However, demographic change com-
bined with a widespread abandonment of  familial support systems can 
explain the boom in saving that occurred there.
The results presented here make use of  a similar simulation model to 
assess the implications of population change for wealth and income. The 
details of the model are described in Mason and Lee (2007) and only its key 
features are sketched out here.
The economy is assumed to be completely open to international capital 
fl ows and interest rates, so domestic wages and interest rates are unaﬀected 
by the supply of capital by residents. The age profi le of labor income is fi xed; 
for example, relative productivity and labor force participation rates do not 
change over time, but the labor income profi le shifts upward in response to 
technological growth, which is exogenously determined. These aspects of the 
model are relatively conventional. However, the treatment of consumption 
and saving in the model is distinctive.
The model used here implicitly assumes that intergenerational altruism 
is a pervasive feature of the society. We assume that the cross- sectional age-
 consumption profi le incorporates those preferences for the well- being, for 
example, of children and the elderly. The shape of this age profi le is assumed 
not to change over time but it shifts upward (or downward) depending on the 
accumulation of assets, technological progress, and changes in the support 
ratio driven by changing population age structure. Individual consumption 
is determined only indirectly by the individual’s economic success, since 
there is extensive sharing of income through public and private intergenera-
tional transfers. Likewise, total consumption by a cohort at each age is only 
indirectly infl uenced by the lifetime economic success of that cohort. This 
approach is far more consistent with the consumption patterns observed in 
Asia, which in each year are quite constant across all adult ages, regardless 
of the income histories of each generation.5
Consumption at older ages is realized through a combination of intergen-
erational transfers and life cycle saving. The importance of transfers relative 
to life cycle saving is exogenously determined and treated in this model as 
a policy variable or a feature of each society. The economy is subject to an 
aggregate budget constraint on fl ows that, along with other features of the 
model, determines the time path of assets, transfer wealth and implicit debt, 
and income.
In each period, t aggregate wealth is equal to the present value of current 
and future consumption of all individuals who are adults in year t, less the 
5. Models based on the standard life- cycle theory or the Ramsey approach produce broadly 
similar results.
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present value of current and future labor income of all individuals who are 
adults in year t. Wealth (W ) defi ned in this way is a broad measure of wealth 
that includes both real assets (A) and the present value of current and future 
net transfers to year t adults, called transfer wealth (T ). Transfer wealth con-
sists of two components: child transfer wealth and pension transfer wealth. 
Child transfer wealth is the present value of transfers from year t adults to 
living dependent children and to children who will be born in the future. 
Child transfer wealth is negative and it is equal to the present value of the 
future cost of children to those who are adults in year t.
Pension transfer wealth is the present value of net transfers that year t 
adults will receive from year t children and from future generations. These 
transfers may be familial transfers or public transfers. Pension transfer 
wealth is the counterpart of  implicit debt—the transfer wealth of  those 
who are adults today is equal in magnitude to the implicit debt of future 
generations. Implicit debt as calculated here is not limited to public transfers 
programs; for example, PAYGO pension programs. It includes all intergen-
erational transfers whether public or private (familial).
The impact of  demographic change on capital accumulation and eco-
nomic growth depends on the extent to which the economy in question 
relies on pension transfer wealth versus capital accumulation to support 
consumption in old age. We treat this as an exogenous variable rooted in 
each country’s institutions, but changeable through policy. Thus we specify 
the relative shares of assets and pension transfer wealth. Two sets of results 
are presented following. In one, a very low percentage of pension wealth is 
transfer wealth (35 percent) with assets accounting for the other 65 percent. 
In the alternative simulation, transfer wealth is 65 percent of pension wealth 
and assets are 35 percent.
Before we turn to the results it should be clearly stated that the model is 
not intended to be a complete and comprehensive model of the economy. Its 
purpose is quite specifi c to showing how demographic changes are likely to 
infl uence wealth and assets, and with what implication for economic growth. 
There are three ways in which demographic change will infl uence wealth 
in our model. First, changes in the support ratio infl uence consumption at 
each age. If  the support ratio is high, perhaps due to low fertility, then higher 
consumption at every age is possible. Anticipated higher consumption at 
old age means that more wealth (assets plus pension transfer wealth) must 
be held at every age to fi nance that consumption. Second, people are living 
longer. To support consumption over an extended period of  retirement, 
they must accumulate more wealth during their working years. Third, given 
the age profi le of wealth holdings, changes in the population age structure 
infl uence aggregate wealth. Up to a point, wealth rises with age and, hence, 
a population concentrated in the late working years and early retirement 
years has greater wealth, in one form or the other.
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1.2.3   Simulation Results for ASEAN
Simulated net saving rates in ASEAN for 1950 to 2050 are shown in fi gure 
1.10. Comparative results will be presented in the next section. Productivity 
growth is assumed to be 2 percent per annum here and in all other results 
presented. The high intergenerational (IG) transfer simulation gives the sav-
ing rate if  65 percent of  the wealth required to support consumption in 
old age is provided through public and familial transfer programs. The low 
intergenerational (IG) transfer simulation gives the saving rate if  intergen-
erational transfers cover only 35 percent of the consumption needed during 
retirement.
Changes in age structure lead to a rise and then to a decline in net saving 
rates. One might incorrectly infer from the pattern that population aging 
is leading to a decline in saving rates, but this is not correct. Saving rates 
are rising in anticipation of population aging. The change in saving rates is 
transitory, however. As the population stabilizes at an older age structure, 
saving rates decline to levels closer to their pretransition level.
Saving rates are strongly infl uenced by the size of intergenerational trans-
fers. If  transfers play a modest role in supporting the consumption of older 
adults, changes in age structure have a very substantial eﬀect on net saving 
rates, which rise from about 3 percent of national income in 1950 to peak at 
23 percent of national income in 2010.
If  intergenerational transfers play a dominant role in providing support 
to the elderly, then the eﬀect of age structure on saving is moderate. Net na-
tional saving rates rise from 2 percent in 1950 to peak at around 8 percent in 
1985 before gradually declining.
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Fig. 1.10  Net saving rate simulations, ASEAN population, 1950– 2050
Note: Low (high) IG transfer assumes that transfer wealth is 35 percent (65 percent) of  pen-
sion wealth.
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The impact of age structure on assets is substantial (fi gure 1.11). In 1950 
the ratio of total assets to total labor income is about 0.3 for both intergen-
erational transfer systems. By 1990 assets have increased to 1.5 times labor 
income for the low IG transfer case and to 1.2 times labor income in the high 
IG transfer case. After 1990, the systems diverge with assets relative to labor 
income increasing to 7 in 2050 for the low IG transfer case, but only to 2 in 
2050 for the high IG transfer case. Total wealth in 2050 in the low IG transfer 
case is also 350 percent greater than in the high IG transfer case in 2050.6
As compared with 1950, changes in age structure lead to about a 30 per-
cent increase in consumption per equivalent consumer in 2030 given the high 
IG transfer policy (fi gure 1.12). Using the low IG transfer policy, changes in 
age structure lead to an increase in consumption per equivalent consumer 
of about 50 percent in 2050. Note that the higher consumption after 2025 
for the low IG transfer policy comes with a cost. The higher saving rates and 
lower consumption rates necessary lead to lower consumption between 1995 
and 2020 under the low IG transfer policy than under the high IG transfer 
policy. Consumption remains permanently higher under the low IG trans-
fer policy. Over the next 100 years (not shown) consumption is 20 percent 
higher on average given the low IG transfer policy. In a closed economy these 
diﬀerences would be larger.
The simulations presume that the economic life cycle itself  does not re-
spond to changes in age structure and, hence, the gains (or losses) in con-
sumption are equally shared by all age groups. Of course, other outcomes are 
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Fig. 1.11  Asset / labor income, ASEAN population, 1950– 2050
Note: Low (high) IG transfer assumes that transfer wealth is 35 percent (65 percent) of  life 
cycle pension wealth.
6. Because a small open economy assumption is used, labor income growth is the same in either 
case. The greater wealth is accumulated as foreign assets in the low IG transfer economy.
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possible. The elderly might fl ex its political power and increase its consump-
tion relative to younger generations. Or young generations may rebel if  IG 
transfers are too burdensome to the detriment of the elderly.
1.2.4   Comparative Results
The results presented in this section focus more narrowly on two periods: 
from 1995 to 2005, and from 2005 to 2020. The eﬀects of changes in age 
structure on saving rates depend on the importance of  intergenerational 
transfers to the elderly (table 1.8). Given low reliance on intergenerational 
transfers, net national saving rates reach very high peaks in 1995 in greater 
China, Japan, and Korea. In these countries saving rates decline to interme-
diate levels in 2005, and to much lower levels in 2025. In India and ASEAN, 
the saving eﬀects are somewhat more modest and are delayed refl ecting the 
slower and later changes in age structure.
If  intergenerational transfers play a very important role, the eﬀects of age 
structure on saving are muted.
Accumulated assets are reported in table 1.9. Age structure has a substan-
tial infl uence on the life cycle demand for assets if  intergenerational transfers 
are low. In this case, the ratio of assets to labor income in 1995 ranges from 
1.1 given the demography of India, to 10.2 given the demography of Japan. 
The demand for life cycle assets grows in all cases between 1995 and 2005, 
and between 2005 and 2025. By 2025, Korea is approaching the simulated 
level of assets for Japan. Percentage growth rates are very strong in ASEAN 
and India. Between 1995 and 2025, assets relative to labor income increase 
threefold in both cases.
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The complexities of  the relationship between age structure and con-
sumption growth are apparent in table 1.10. Consumption growth changes 
because of changes in income per eﬀective consumer and changes in the 
ratio of consumption to national income that underlie the second dividend. 
If  the consumption ratio changes very little, the trend in consumption is 
dominated by changes in the support ratio; for example, the fi rst dividend. 
Thus, consumption per equivalent consumer will grow more rapidly during 
the dividend period and then decline as population aging dominates the 
support ratio.
However, if  there is a strong response in the consumption ratio the out-
come is more complex. Rapid accumulation of capital is realized through 
a decline in the consumption ratio and slow growth in consumption per 
eﬀective consumer. As the consumption ratio rises from low levels, however, 
consumption growth can be very rapid.
Consumption growth in ASEAN shows this pattern. Given a strong sav-
ing response (low intergenerational transfers), consumption growth is slow 
from 1995 until 2005, but very substantial from 2005 to 2025. In contrast, 
given a modest saving response (high intergenerational transfers), consump-
tion growth is more rapid from 1995 to 2005, and dissipates between 2005 
and 2025.
The situation in India is somewhat diﬀerent. From 1995 to 2005, con-
Table 1.8 Net saving/national income (%), country groupings
IG trans share low (0.35) IG trans share high (0.65)
  1995  2005  2025  1995  2005  2025
ASEAN 13.6 21.5 18.5 7.5 7.3 4.9
China  32.4 21.6 6.5 7.6 5.3 2.8
India 7.0 15.0 21.6 7.1 7.6 5.7
Japan 38.6 15.9 3.5 4.5 2.9 1.4
Korea, Rep. of  52.9  32.4  2.6  7.9  4.7  1.4
Note: IG  intergenerational.
Table 1.9 Assets/labor income, country groupings
IG trans share low (0.35) IG trans share high (0.65)
  1995  2005  2025  1995  2005   2025
ASEAN 1.6 2.4 5.0 1.3 1.5 1.8
China  2.6 4.4 7.1 1.5 1.7 2.0
India 1.1 1.5 3.9 1.0 1.2 1.7
Japan 10.2 13.6 14.9 2.5 2.6 2.8
Korea, Rep. of  5.2  8.9  12.7  2.1  2.2  2.3
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sumption is actually declining modestly (relative to productivity gains) as a 
result of a decline in the share of national income consumed. Consumption 
rebounds after 2005. For the two decades taken as a whole, consumption 
growth rates are the same given either policy, but more detailed results show 
that consumption growth is substantially more rapid given the high saving 
scenario after 2015.
Greater China, Japan, and Korea are in similar situations given a low level 
of intergenerational transfers. For the period from 1995 to 2005, consump-
tion growth is very rapid—ranging from 3 percent to nearly 6 percent above 
the assumed rate of productivity growth of 2 percent per year. During this 
period saving rates are declining from the high levels of 1995 and earlier, 
and income growth is strong leading to rapid growth in consumption. After 
2005, consumption growth rates are well above those possible in the absence 
of a strong saving response.
A note of caution is in order here. The very large simulated eﬀects are 
conditioned on low intergenerational transfers. The evidence from Japan, 
Taiwan, and preliminary estimates for Korea not presented here indicates 
that intergenerational transfers to the elderly were closer to the high IG 
transfer scenario than the low IG transfer scenario. Hence, the second divi-
dends realized in East Asia were probably well below the possible gains that 
could have been realized. Estimates of the contribution of changes in age 
structure to growth in per capita income in East Asia range from about one-
 third to one- quarter of actual growth (Bloom and Williamson 1998; Mason 
2001). The simulated impact on consumption is substantially greater than 
the simulated eﬀect on per capita income, because of the rapid increase in 
consumption rates for Korea, Japan, and greater China.
1.3   Discussion and Conclusions
Declining mortality followed by declining fertility leads to a roller coaster 
of changes in dependency with initial increases in child dependency, then a 
period of improving support ratios spanning about fi fty years and generat-
Table 1.10 Annual growth in consumption due to age structure (%), 
country groupings
IG trans share low (0.35) IG trans share high (0.65)
  1995–2005  2005–2025  1995–2005  2005–2025
ASEAN 0.3 1.2 0.9 0.6
China  3.0 1.4 1.0 0.1
India –0.2 0.7 0.6 0.7
Japan 4.1 0.5 0.0 –0.3
Korea, Rep. of  5.9  2.6  1.0  0.0
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ing the fi rst dividend, and fi nally population aging. Asian countries have all 
entered the fi rst dividend phase, with India and ASEAN midway through 
it, China and Korea near its end, and Japan well past it and into population 
aging.
Population aging is the inevitable last stage of the demographic transi-
tion, and the costs of  supporting the consumption of a large dependent 
elderly population, refl ected in falling support ratios, lead to concerns by 
policymakers, the media, and the public. The declining support ratios due to 
population aging are a predictable and very concrete aspect of the complex 
constellation of economically important changes occurring over the course 
of the demographic transition, and it is therefore tempting to view popu-
lation aging separately from these other changes that result from the same 
basic causes. Earlier we have highlighted the relation of the demographic 
transition and population aging to increased investment in human capital 
and physical capital. Both raise productivity and incomes far more signifi -
cantly than declining support ratios diminish them.
The changes in age structure that accompany the demographic transition 
are emphasized here because of their importance particularly in countries 
that have experienced rapid fertility decline in East Asia and elsewhere. The 
post- World War II baby booms of  the United States and other Western 
countries have also produced signifi cant changes in age structure and demo-
graphic dividends. These are qualitatively similar to those experienced in 
East Asia but are smaller in scale. Although Japan experienced its own post-
 war baby boom, it was short- lived with little discernable eﬀect.
We will now briefl y consider some policy issues related to these themes.
As noted, population aging will lead to substantial declines in support 
ratios from their peaks at the culmination of the fi rst dividend phase of the 
transition. Assuming that the shapes of the age profi les of consumption and 
labor income do not change, we can calculate the size of these declines. In 
Japan, the support ratio will decline by 25 percent between 2008 and 2050, 
or at 0.7 percent per year. In Korea, the decline will be by 22 percent, or 0.6 
percent per year. In China, the decline will be only 14 percent, and in India 
and ASEAN the support ratio will rise.
The projected declines in support ratios have occasioned deep concerns 
in many countries, since they imply an increased dependency burden on 
the working age population and threaten fi scal instability. They depend on 
both demographic trends and on the age patterns of consumption and labor 
income. Some governments have considered policies to reduce the pace and 
depth of future population aging by raising fertility. The past experience 
of  European nations with pronatalist policies has not been encouraging 
in this regard, however. Another possibility is immigration, but this seems 
unlikely to play a signifi cant role in ameliorating population aging in the 
Asian context, since Asia is a major net supplier of migrants to other parts 
of the world, and the more highly industrialized countries like Japan and 
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Korea have a history of highly restrictive immigration policies (Mason and 
Lee 2008).
Another way to reduce the projected declines in support ratios is to modify 
the age patterns of consumption and labor income in a way that raises sup-
port ratios for a given demographic structure. Policies to encourage later 
retirement have not drawn much attention in Asia; indeed many countries 
have mandatory retirement laws (see Mason and Lee 2008), but later retire-
ment could moderate the decline in support ratios, as could increases in 
female labor supply. The incentive structure created by public pension pro-
grams can have an important eﬀect on retirement behavior (Gruber and 
Wise 1999) and the design of any new pension programs could be shaped 
accordingly. Turning to the consumption age profi les, Japan (Ogawa et al., 
chap. 4 in this volume) and Western industrial countries have experienced 
disproportional increases in consumption by the elderly relative to younger 
adults in recent decades, and such changes exacerbate the costs of popula-
tion aging and its eﬀects on support ratios. Some of this increase in old age 
consumption appears to be driven directly by the structure of public trans-
fers to the elderly for pensions and health care. It is possible that declines 
in elder coresidence with adult children are in part an indirect consequence 
of these public transfers, and this decline may also have contributed to the 
increases in old age consumption by reducing family level income pooling.
The great increase in human capital investment over the course of the 
demographic transition has surely played an important role in economic 
development. Both theory and empirical analysis suggest that the increased 
human capital investment is closely tied to fertility decline and, to a lesser 
degree, mortality decline. However, the direction of causality is not entirely 
clear, leaving some uncertainty about whether policy driven changes in fertil-
ity, for example through pronatalist policies, would lead to opposite changes 
in human capital.
In the global context, East Asia stands out as investing particularly heavily 
in children’s human capital, but in our analysis (Lee and Mason 2009) the 
level of investment is to be expected, given the exceptionally low fertility in 
East Asia. The strong role for private spending on education, complement-
ing public education, is also distinctive in East Asia. Given this already 
strong pattern of human capital investment, the main policy concern ap-
pears to be that new policies not interfere with this existing tendency. It is 
also possible that the demand for a high level of human capital investment 
is itself  a driving force behind the very low levels of fertility in East Asia.
Our fi nal point is the need for governments and societies to consider care-
fully the arrangements supporting consumption by the elderly, and potential 
changes in these arrangements. Should continuation of familial support for 
the elderly be encouraged by policy? Or should governments move toward 
public pension programs, and should any new pension programs be funded 
or PAYGO?
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A switch from familial support to public PAYGO pensions may entail less 
change than it appears, since both accumulate implicit debt as the popu-
lation ages, and both entail increasing dependency burdens on the working 
age adult. However, public sector pension programs spread the support costs 
more evenly across the population while altering the incentives of the elderly 
and adult children in various ways. In either case, it should be kept in mind 
that the transfer wealth generated by familial support or PAYGO pensions 
is likely to substitute for capital in individual’s retirement plans. Transfer 
programs of these kinds likely diminish the promotion of capital accumula-
tion by population aging, the second dividend. Policies that encourage life-
 cycle saving and personal retirement accounts, whether public or private, 
would enable countries to harness the power of population aging to generate 
increased capital per worker.
There are trade- oﬀs between the benefi ts and drawbacks of  familial, 
PAYGO, and funded old age support programs, and each society may choose 
a diﬀerent mix. The key point is that most but not all of the countries of 
Asia are still at an early enough stage in the transition that they have options 
that are no longer open to Japan and the other industrial nations. For these 
countries to transit from their PAYGO programs to funded programs would 
entail very heavy costs amounting to a year or several years’ worth of GDP. 
For countries earlier in the transition that do not yet have comprehensive 
PAYGO programs, steps to encourage individual responsibility for own 
retirement are much more feasible and less painful.
Population aging and the forces leading to it produce not only frightening 
declines in support ratios, but also very substantial increases in productivity 
and per capita income. Low fertility and low mortality are associated with 
large increases in human capital investment in children, and they also cause 
large increases in the accumulation of physical capital. Together, these posi-
tive changes will likely outweigh the problems of declining support ratios. 
Population aging brings economic benefi ts as well as costs, and we should 
view this package of consequences as a whole, while developing policies to 
minimize the costs and amplify the benefi ts.
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Comment Jocelyn E. Finlay
In their chapter, Mason, Lee, and Lee explore the macroeconomic implica-
tions of the decline in fertility and mortality over the past fi fty years with a 
particular focus on the Asian region.
During the demographic transition there is a decline in the mortality rate 
followed (often much later, as in the case of India) by the decline in the fer-
tility rate. In the early stages of the demographic transition when mortality 
rates fall but the fertility rate remains high, population growth is very strong. 
In India, during this window of time the population growth rate hiked from 
0.3 in 1900 to 2.2 around 1980.
The economic implications of the demographic transition have long been 
an avenue of enquiry. It was the work by Kelley and Schmidt (1995) which 
showed that population growth as a single variable did not have a signifi -
cant eﬀect on economic growth, but rather the components behind popula-
tion growth were considered empirically important and theoretically inter-
esting.
In addition to their eﬀect on population growth, changes in mortality and 
fertility rates also have an eﬀect on age structure of the population. With 
people living longer, the number of people in the older age groups increases. 
Couple this with the decline in fertility and the proportion of youth relative 
to the elderly declines.
One striking demographic feature that has come about during the demo-
graphic transition is the rise in the working- age share. When the fertility 
rate declines, the number of youth- age individuals declines relative to the 
number of working- age individuals. The working- age share increases. The 
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